On the Special Occaision of Yaum - e - Pakistan PKC Groups and Blogs Tribute to Mohsin - e - Pakistan Dr. A. Q. Khan
Chaghai Hills soon after the Nuclear Test
Dr. A.Q. Khan, head of the Khan Research Laboratory, poses with Pakistani nuclear scientists following the Chagai Hills nuclear test. The dust in the background was stirred up moments earlier by the detonation within the mountain test site.
Scientists at the Chagai Hills test site pose for a photograph on 28 May 1998. At extreme right behind the scientists is Prime Minister Naawaz Sharif.
stands in the access tunnel inside the Chagai Hills nuclear test site before Pakistan's 28 May 1998 underground nuclear test
Dr. A. Q. Khan in his Home
Portrait of Dr. A. Q. Khan
Pakistani Missiles those can Carry Nuclear War Heads
(Details are at the bottom of this Presentation)
Nuclear weapons
In the mid 1980s, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission began to pursue Plutonium production capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (megawatt, thermal) Khushab Research Reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who informed the world that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Various Pakistani industrys contributed in 82% of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements made by the US Government officials, this heavy water reactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of plutonium per year with increase in the production by the development of newer facilities, sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon. The reactor could also produce tririum if it were loaded with lithium – 6, although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use Li directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnefie Endowment for International Peace, Khushab's Plutonium production capacity has allowed Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of the ballistic missiles.
Plutonium separation takes place at the New Labs Reprocessing Plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
In late 2006, the US Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as much as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year." The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's third plutonium reactor, signalling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads.
Arsenal
In 2000, US Military intelligence estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads. The actual size is hard for experts to gauge owing to the extreme secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. In recent developments, retired Brig. General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper the nation has "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads," and also revealed that Pakistan has decoy or dummy warheads to complicate any designs by aggressors.
Pakistan tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear test of 30 May 1998 at Kharan. In this test, the latest and most sophisticated bomb design made to be carried by missiles was tested. Compactness is also an issue with F-16s and other fighter-bomber aircraft of the same class, unless the platform happens to be a dedicated strategic bomber. F-16s have limits to the size and weight of the bombs they can carry. But as the plutonium bombs are much lighter than the uranium bombs it is much easier for Pakistan to fit plutonium bombs on the F-16s and the latest fourth generation fighter jet JF-17 which has started serial production in Pakistan in January, 2008.
The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52 kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 8–10 kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6 kg of Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosion-type weapons, they will typically use between 15–25 kg of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U-235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron reflector/tamper material such as beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic form. Add about 50 or so chemical high-explosive lenses, triggering circuits, and outer aluminium casing, all this adds to the overall weight of the device. Therefore if a bomb has to use only U-235, that will impose serious restrictions on the amount of U-235 that can be used, and the size of the bomb itself, thus restricting its explosive yield. True PAEC did develop bomb designs that could be carried by all PAF aircraft, but after years of effort and R&D, and then too, there were serious limitations on the further extent of miniaturization of the bombs. If uranium is used as bomb fuel, it cannot be miniaturized beyond a certain point.
However, only 2–4 kg of plutonium is needed for the same device that would need 20–25 kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of three to four. "The sixth Pakistani nuclear test (May 30, 1998) at Kharan was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%."
A whole range and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built, both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be a nuclear power with an operational deterrent capability, both first and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft), the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the first choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal.
As for Pakistan's plutonium capability, it has always been there, from the early 1980s onwards. There were only two problems. One was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state and so did not divert spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessing at New Labs. This was enough to build a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons straight away. So PAEC built its own plutonium and tritium production reactor at Khushab, beginning in 1985. The second one was allocation of resources.
Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done simply by putting natural uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, beginning at uranium mining and refining, production of uranium ore or yellow cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide UO2 (which is used to make nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion of UO2 into uranium tetrafluoride UF4 and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF6).
The complete mastery of fluorine chemistry and production of highly toxic and corrosive hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds is required. The UF6 is pumped into the centrifuges for enrichment. The process is then repeated in reverse until UF4 is produced, leading to the production of uranium metal, the form in which U-235 is used in a bomb.
It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This means that with P2 machines, they would be producing between 75–100 kg of HEU since 1986, when full production of weapons-grade HEU began. Also the production of HEU was voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, and the five nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 also consumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986 and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced 1500 kg of HEU. Accounting for losses in the production of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would need 20 kg of HEU; sufficient for 75 bombs as in 2005.
Pakistan's first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested. It is reported that the yields from these tests were 12kt, 30 to 35kt and four low-yield (below 1 kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25kt and 150kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and may have 300–500kt large-size warheads. The low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried on F-16 Fighting Falcon and the JF-17 Thunder aircraft and fitted to Pakistan's short-range ballistic missiles, while the higher-yield warheads are probably fitted to the Shaheen series and Ghauri series ballistic missiles.
Pakistan has not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the US Defence Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."
The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the NCA. It was established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two committees that advise the present President of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex.
It has been recently reported by the Pakistani Press namely Jang that Pakistan has the ability to MIRV its missiles. This has been seen as possibly one of the greatest achievement to date for Pakistan. It has also been reported that Pakistan would likely MIRV its Shaheen – II and Ghauri – II missiles.
Pakistan and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan began focusing on nuclear development in January 1972 under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons development program was in response to neighboring India's development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior scientists and engineers on 20 January 1972, in Multan. It was here that Bhutto rallied Pakistan's scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival. At the Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed Pakistani nuclear scientist, Munir Ahmad Khan (a U.S trained scientist), as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who till then had been working as Director of Nuclear Power and Reactor Division at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria. This marked the beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear capability.
Consequently, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgical engineer, working at the Dutch research firm URENCO, also joined Pakistan's nuclear weapons – grade Uranium enrichment program. The Uranium enrichment program had been launched in 1974 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan as Project – 706. A.Q. Khan joined the project in the spring of 1976 and was made Project-Director in July 1976 after taking over from another nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood.. In 1983, Khan was accused of the theft of the blueprints, though the false allegation was overturned on a legal technicality.
Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
On 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's second nuclear test (Operation Shakti), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the Chagai Hills in the Chaghai district, Balochistan. This operation was named Chagai – I by Pakistan, the base having been long-constructed by provincial Martial Law Administrator Rahimuddin Khan during the 1980s. Pakistan's fissle material production takes place at Kahuta and Khushab / Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium is made by the scientists.
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program was established in 1974 when the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) was set up in PAEC by chairman Munir Ahmad Khan. Khan was credited as the one of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a recent study from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London's dossier on Pakistan's nuclear program. DTD was assigned the task of developing the implosion design, trigger mechanism, physics calculations, high-speed electronics, high-precision chemical and mechanical components, high explosive lenses for Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The DTD had come up with its first implosion design of a nuclear weapon by 1978 which was then improved and later tested on 11 March 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan's first successful cold test of a nuclear device. Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also developed a miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air Force aircraft.
Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility, a Washington-based science think tank has reported. Estimated Pakistani nuclear weapons is probably in the neighborhood of more than 200 by the end of 2008. "The sixth Pakistani nuclear test (May 30, 1998) at Kharan was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%.". Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is "likely finished and that the roof beams are being placed on top of the third Khushab reactor hall". According to one Western official close to the matter, regardless of international efforts to apply crippling economic sanctions to Pakistan, "it is now pretty clear that Pakistan is going to go ahead with its weapons program and that the logic dictates that they will use the plutonium" generated by Khushab.
In an attempt to modernize its Air Force, Pakistan has recently signed a deal for the purchase of 26 F-16 block 15OCUs that were under Peace Gate 3/4 and 60 MLU kits for block 15s, AMRAAMs, LGBs, and various other missiles and bombs and other items, the purchase of 18 F-16 block 50/52+ with an option of 18 more. If all options are exercised, this deal will cost US$5 billion. All of these F-16s will be capable of nuclear weapons delivery.
Also, by early 2007, the first 8 JF – 17 Thunder aircraft (FC-1s) have entered into the PAF service. These are pre-production aircraft and more JF-17 Thunder aircraft will follow. These, too, will be capable of nuclear weapons delivery. Pakistan Air Force to modernize its fleet has also ordered 36 Chinese J-10s for its airforce for a cost of $1.4 billion.
Pakistan has also recently tested its indegious Babur Cruise Missile having a range of 700 km. Its design appears to be influenced by the Tomahawk Cruise Missile of the US in terms of its appearance and its advanced specifications. However Pakistan Firmly stands by its claims of an indigenous design of the Babur. It is a ground-launched version capable of evading radar detection. The air-Launch version Ra'ad Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) with a range of 350KM have also been successfully test fired from various Aircrafts, and is being manufactured for the Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy. According to the Pakistan Military sources the Submarine-Launched Version is in advance stages of Testing. One Western official specifically asserted that the missile could penetrate both the Patriot and Arrow II Theater missile defense systems with relative ease. Pakistan's development of a modern cruise missile marks yet another milestone in the country's conventional military buildup, and presents a new state of challenges for both Indian and American policymakers.
Naval Delivery
Chaghai Hills soon after the Nuclear Test
Dr. A.Q. Khan, head of the Khan Research Laboratory, poses with Pakistani nuclear scientists following the Chagai Hills nuclear test. The dust in the background was stirred up moments earlier by the detonation within the mountain test site.
Scientists at the Chagai Hills test site pose for a photograph on 28 May 1998. At extreme right behind the scientists is Prime Minister Naawaz Sharif.
stands in the access tunnel inside the Chagai Hills nuclear test site before Pakistan's 28 May 1998 underground nuclear test
Dr. A. Q. Khan in his Home
Portrait of Dr. A. Q. Khan
Pakistani Missiles those can Carry Nuclear War Heads
(Details are at the bottom of this Presentation)
Hataf - II Abdali
Hataf - III Ghazmavi
Hataf - IV Shaheen - I
Hataf - V Ghauri
Hataf - VI Shaheen
Hataf - VII Babur (Cruise Missile)
Aircraft & Naval Delivery of Pakistani Nuclear Warheads
(Details are at the bottom of this Presentation)
Pride of Pakistan JF 17 Thunder Flying on Jehlum River
F - 16 Pakistan Fighter Aircraft
Mirage Flying over Korakoram Mountains
A-5C armed with four HAFR-2 anti-runway bombs on a training mission
F - 7P Standing on Chaklala Airbase on Airforce Day
PNS-M Hamza, photographed at PNS Qasim during the Joint Forces Display held at the conclusion of IDEAS 2006 Defence Exhibition
Nuclear weapons
| Country Name Pakistan | |
Nuclear program start date | 1 January 1972 |
First nuclear weapon test | 28 May 1998 |
First fusion weapon test | 11 March 1983 |
Last nuclear test | 30 May 1998 |
Largest yield test | 25-36 kt of TNT (announced)28 May 1998 |
Total tests | 6 detonations |
Peak stockpile | 250 warheads (2008) |
Current stockpile | 250 warheads (increasing stockpiles) |
Maximum missile range | 4,500 km (Shaheen – III) |
NPT signatory | No |
Policy
Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15 April 1960, the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 28 October 1997.In 1999 Pakistan signed the Lahore Accords with India, agreeing on a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. However, Pakistan, like India and Israel, is not a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty and, consequently, not bound by any of its provisions.Protection
US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton informed that Pakistan has dispersed its nuclear weapons throughout the country, increasing the Security so that they could not fall into terrorist hands. Her comments came as new satellite images released by the ISIS suggested Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium, a fuel for atomic bombs. The institute has also claimed that Pakistan has built two more nuclear reactors at Khoshab increasing the number of plutonium producing reactors to three.Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program is based, primarily, on highly-enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the Kahuta Research Laboratories at Kahuta, a Zippe centrifuge -based uranium-enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in use since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centifuges in operation, and Pakistan has continued its pursuit of expanded uranium-enrichment capabilities.In the mid 1980s, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission began to pursue Plutonium production capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (megawatt, thermal) Khushab Research Reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who informed the world that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Various Pakistani industrys contributed in 82% of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements made by the US Government officials, this heavy water reactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of plutonium per year with increase in the production by the development of newer facilities, sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon. The reactor could also produce tririum if it were loaded with lithium – 6, although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use Li directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnefie Endowment for International Peace, Khushab's Plutonium production capacity has allowed Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of the ballistic missiles.
Plutonium separation takes place at the New Labs Reprocessing Plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
In late 2006, the US Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as much as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year." The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's third plutonium reactor, signalling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads.
Arsenal
In 2000, US Military intelligence estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads. The actual size is hard for experts to gauge owing to the extreme secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. In recent developments, retired Brig. General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper the nation has "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads," and also revealed that Pakistan has decoy or dummy warheads to complicate any designs by aggressors.
Pakistan tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear test of 30 May 1998 at Kharan. In this test, the latest and most sophisticated bomb design made to be carried by missiles was tested. Compactness is also an issue with F-16s and other fighter-bomber aircraft of the same class, unless the platform happens to be a dedicated strategic bomber. F-16s have limits to the size and weight of the bombs they can carry. But as the plutonium bombs are much lighter than the uranium bombs it is much easier for Pakistan to fit plutonium bombs on the F-16s and the latest fourth generation fighter jet JF-17 which has started serial production in Pakistan in January, 2008.
The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52 kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 8–10 kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6 kg of Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosion-type weapons, they will typically use between 15–25 kg of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U-235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron reflector/tamper material such as beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic form. Add about 50 or so chemical high-explosive lenses, triggering circuits, and outer aluminium casing, all this adds to the overall weight of the device. Therefore if a bomb has to use only U-235, that will impose serious restrictions on the amount of U-235 that can be used, and the size of the bomb itself, thus restricting its explosive yield. True PAEC did develop bomb designs that could be carried by all PAF aircraft, but after years of effort and R&D, and then too, there were serious limitations on the further extent of miniaturization of the bombs. If uranium is used as bomb fuel, it cannot be miniaturized beyond a certain point.
However, only 2–4 kg of plutonium is needed for the same device that would need 20–25 kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of three to four. "The sixth Pakistani nuclear test (May 30, 1998) at Kharan was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%."
A whole range and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built, both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be a nuclear power with an operational deterrent capability, both first and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft), the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the first choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal.
As for Pakistan's plutonium capability, it has always been there, from the early 1980s onwards. There were only two problems. One was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state and so did not divert spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessing at New Labs. This was enough to build a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons straight away. So PAEC built its own plutonium and tritium production reactor at Khushab, beginning in 1985. The second one was allocation of resources.
Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done simply by putting natural uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, beginning at uranium mining and refining, production of uranium ore or yellow cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide UO2 (which is used to make nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion of UO2 into uranium tetrafluoride UF4 and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF6).
The complete mastery of fluorine chemistry and production of highly toxic and corrosive hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds is required. The UF6 is pumped into the centrifuges for enrichment. The process is then repeated in reverse until UF4 is produced, leading to the production of uranium metal, the form in which U-235 is used in a bomb.
It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This means that with P2 machines, they would be producing between 75–100 kg of HEU since 1986, when full production of weapons-grade HEU began. Also the production of HEU was voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, and the five nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 also consumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986 and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced 1500 kg of HEU. Accounting for losses in the production of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would need 20 kg of HEU; sufficient for 75 bombs as in 2005.
Pakistan's first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested. It is reported that the yields from these tests were 12kt, 30 to 35kt and four low-yield (below 1 kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25kt and 150kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and may have 300–500kt large-size warheads. The low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried on F-16 Fighting Falcon and the JF-17 Thunder aircraft and fitted to Pakistan's short-range ballistic missiles, while the higher-yield warheads are probably fitted to the Shaheen series and Ghauri series ballistic missiles.
Doctrine
Pakistan's motive, as stated by its former President Muhammad Zia ul Haq in 1985, for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India.Pakistan has not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the US Defence Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."
The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the NCA. It was established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two committees that advise the present President of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex.
It has been recently reported by the Pakistani Press namely Jang that Pakistan has the ability to MIRV its missiles. This has been seen as possibly one of the greatest achievement to date for Pakistan. It has also been reported that Pakistan would likely MIRV its Shaheen – II and Ghauri – II missiles.
Pakistan and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan began focusing on nuclear development in January 1972 under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons development program was in response to neighboring India's development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior scientists and engineers on 20 January 1972, in Multan. It was here that Bhutto rallied Pakistan's scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival. At the Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed Pakistani nuclear scientist, Munir Ahmad Khan (a U.S trained scientist), as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who till then had been working as Director of Nuclear Power and Reactor Division at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria. This marked the beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear capability.
Consequently, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgical engineer, working at the Dutch research firm URENCO, also joined Pakistan's nuclear weapons – grade Uranium enrichment program. The Uranium enrichment program had been launched in 1974 by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan as Project – 706. A.Q. Khan joined the project in the spring of 1976 and was made Project-Director in July 1976 after taking over from another nuclear scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood.. In 1983, Khan was accused of the theft of the blueprints, though the false allegation was overturned on a legal technicality.
Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
On 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's second nuclear test (Operation Shakti), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the Chagai Hills in the Chaghai district, Balochistan. This operation was named Chagai – I by Pakistan, the base having been long-constructed by provincial Martial Law Administrator Rahimuddin Khan during the 1980s. Pakistan's fissle material production takes place at Kahuta and Khushab / Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium is made by the scientists.
Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program was established in 1974 when the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) was set up in PAEC by chairman Munir Ahmad Khan. Khan was credited as the one of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a recent study from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London's dossier on Pakistan's nuclear program. DTD was assigned the task of developing the implosion design, trigger mechanism, physics calculations, high-speed electronics, high-precision chemical and mechanical components, high explosive lenses for Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The DTD had come up with its first implosion design of a nuclear weapon by 1978 which was then improved and later tested on 11 March 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan's first successful cold test of a nuclear device. Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also developed a miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air Force aircraft.
Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility, a Washington-based science think tank has reported. Estimated Pakistani nuclear weapons is probably in the neighborhood of more than 200 by the end of 2008. "The sixth Pakistani nuclear test (May 30, 1998) at Kharan was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%.". Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is "likely finished and that the roof beams are being placed on top of the third Khushab reactor hall". According to one Western official close to the matter, regardless of international efforts to apply crippling economic sanctions to Pakistan, "it is now pretty clear that Pakistan is going to go ahead with its weapons program and that the logic dictates that they will use the plutonium" generated by Khushab.
Aircraft delivery
There are two units operating the Chinese-built A – 5 (No. 16 Sqn and No. 26 Sqn), an aircraft believed to be a leading candidate for the aerial delivery of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The others are the Mirage IIIOs, Mirage IIIODs and Mirage IIIEs. The Pakistan Air Force, currently, operates some 156 Mirage (III & V) aircraft. The allocation of 90 of these aircraft is not, currently, known. Pakistan also has 46 F – 16 Fighter aircraft—all block 15s. As of now, it recently received 2 block 15OCUs through Peace Gate 3/4 as a good-will gesture from the US Government in November 2006. All of these F-16s are capable of delivering nuclear warheads, they are split into 2 squadrons, both stationed at PAF Sargodha. It is rumoured that the 34 current PAF F-16s have been modified for nuclear weapons delivery by PAC, Kamra. Also, in the 1990s, the PAF F-16s have practiced toss-bombing which is a method to deliver nuclear weapons. Pakistan prefers to use ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to deliver nuclear warheads because they have a much longer range than aircraft and do not need the airspace to be cleared of aircraft and SAMS.In an attempt to modernize its Air Force, Pakistan has recently signed a deal for the purchase of 26 F-16 block 15OCUs that were under Peace Gate 3/4 and 60 MLU kits for block 15s, AMRAAMs, LGBs, and various other missiles and bombs and other items, the purchase of 18 F-16 block 50/52+ with an option of 18 more. If all options are exercised, this deal will cost US$5 billion. All of these F-16s will be capable of nuclear weapons delivery.
Also, by early 2007, the first 8 JF – 17 Thunder aircraft (FC-1s) have entered into the PAF service. These are pre-production aircraft and more JF-17 Thunder aircraft will follow. These, too, will be capable of nuclear weapons delivery. Pakistan Air Force to modernize its fleet has also ordered 36 Chinese J-10s for its airforce for a cost of $1.4 billion.
Pakistan has also recently tested its indegious Babur Cruise Missile having a range of 700 km. Its design appears to be influenced by the Tomahawk Cruise Missile of the US in terms of its appearance and its advanced specifications. However Pakistan Firmly stands by its claims of an indigenous design of the Babur. It is a ground-launched version capable of evading radar detection. The air-Launch version Ra'ad Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) with a range of 350KM have also been successfully test fired from various Aircrafts, and is being manufactured for the Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy. According to the Pakistan Military sources the Submarine-Launched Version is in advance stages of Testing. One Western official specifically asserted that the missile could penetrate both the Patriot and Arrow II Theater missile defense systems with relative ease. Pakistan's development of a modern cruise missile marks yet another milestone in the country's conventional military buildup, and presents a new state of challenges for both Indian and American policymakers.
Naval Delivery
Naval Delivery: PNS Hamza has just been commissioned last year in August, This submarine is an Augosta 90B and, with a number of modifications, will be able to fire ballistic missiles. These modifications may be happening soon. It is the first submarine in the world to be equipped with the special MESMA Air Independent Propulsion system. This increases diving duration compared to conventional submarines, and gives the Pakistan navy a tactical advantage. It can also fire Babur Cruise Missiles. Soon, other ships and submarines will be retrofitted to fire ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Missiles Delivery
Pakistan's Nuclear Capable Missiles | ||||
Name/Designation | Class | Range: Max Range with Min Payload | Payload | Status |
Hatf – 1 | SRBM | 100 Km | 500 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Abdali | SRBM | 180 Km | 500 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Ghaznavi | SRBM | 290 Km | 500 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
M – 11 | SRBM | 300 Km | 500 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Shaheen – I | SRBM | 750 Km | 850 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Ghauri – I | MRBM | 1500 Km | 750 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Ghauri – II | MRBM | 1800-2300 Km | 750-1200 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Shaheen – II | MRBM | 2000-3500 Km | 500-2500 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Ghauri – III | IRBM | 4000+ Km | 1200+ Kg | Under Development |
Shaheen – III | IRBM | 4500+ Km | 1200+ Kg | Under Development |
Tipu | IRBM | 5000+Km | 2000+Kg | Under Development |
Babur | Land Attack Cruise Missile | 700 Km | 500 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Forces |
Ra'ad | Air Launched Cruise Missile | 350 Km | 500 Kg | Operational with Pakistan's Armed Force |
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